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Abstract: In this essay, I attempt to provide supporting evidence as well as some 
balance for the thesis on ‘Transforming socio-economics with a new epistemology’ 
presented by Hollingworth and Müller (2008). First, I review a personal highlight of 
my own scientific path that illustrates the power of interdisciplinarity as well as unity of 
the mathematical description of natural and social processes. I also argue against the 
claim that complex systems are in general ‘not susceptible to mathematical analysis, 
but must be understood by letting them evolve—over time or with simulation analysis’. 
Moreover, I present evidence of the limits of the claim that scientists working within 
Science II do not make predictions about the future because it is too complex. I stress 
the potentials for a third ‘Quantum Science’ and its associated conceptual and 







The essay of Rogers Hollingworth and Karl Müller (2008) on a new scientific 
framework (Science II) and on the key role of transfers-across-disciplines makes 
fascinating reading. As an active practitioner of several scientific fields (earthquake 
physics and geophysics, statistical physics, financial economics, and some incursions 
in biology and medicine), I witness everyday first-hand the power obtained by back-
and-forth transfer of concepts, methods, and models occurring in interdisciplinary 
work and thus applaud the formalization and synthesis offered by Hollingworth and 
Müller (2008). The next section 2 presents a personal highlight of my own scientific 
path, that illustrates the power of interdisciplinarity as well s unity of the mathematical 
description of natural and social processes 
 But my goal is not just to flatter Rogers and Karl and praise their efforts. I wish 
here to suggest corrections and complements to the broad picture painted in 
Hollingworth and Müller (2008). I will discuss two major claims in some details. First, 
in section 3.1, I take issue with the claim that complex systems are in general ‘not 
susceptible to mathematical analysis, but must be understood by letting them evolve—
over time or with simulation analysis’. In section 3.2, I present evidence of the limits of 
the claim that scientists working within Science II do not make predictions about the 
future, because it is too complex. I conclude with section 4, in which I point out a 
possible missing link between Science I and Science II, namely ‘Quantum Science’, and 
the associated conceptual and philosophical revolution. I also tone down the optimism 
echoed by Hollingworth and Müller (2008) that the approaches in terms of complex 
networks will allow for a stronger transfer of theoretical models across widely disparate 
fields, in particular between the natural and social sciences. 
 
2. A personal highlight illustrating the power of interdisciplinarity and unity of 
the mathematical description of natural and social processes 
Let me illustrate with a personal experience how the power of interdisciplinarity can 
go beyond analogies to create genuinely new paths to discovery. In the example I wish 
to relate, the same fundamental concepts have been found to apply efficiently to model 
on the one hand the triggering processes between earthquakes leading to their complex 
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space-time statistical organization (Helmstetter et al., 2003; Ouillon and Sornette, 
2005; Sornette and Ouillon, 2005) and on the other hand the social response to shocks 
in such examples as Internet downloads in response to information shocks (Johansen 
and Sornette, 2000), the dynamic of sales of book blockbusters (Sornette et al., 2004; 
Deschatres and Sornette, 2005) and of viewers activity on YouTube.com (Crane and 
Sornette, 2007), the time response to social shocks (Roehner et al., 2004), financial 
volatility shocks (Sornette et al., 2003), and financial bubbles and their crashes 
(Johansen et al., 1999, 2000; Sornette, 2003; Andersen and Sornette, 2005; Sornette 
and Zhou, 2006). The research process developed as follows.  
First, the possibility that precursory seismic activity, known as foreshocks, 
could be intimately related to aftershocks has been entertained by several authors in the 
past decades but has not been clearly demonstrated by a combined derivation of the so-
called direct Omori law for aftershocks and of the inverse Omori for foreshocks within 
a consistent model. In a nutshell, the Omori law for aftershocks describes the decay 
rate of seismicity after a large earthquake (called a mainshock), roughly going as the 
inverse of time since the mainshock. The inverse Omori law for foreshocks describes 
the statistically increasing rate of earthquakes going roughly as the inverse of the time 
till the next mainshock. The inverse Omori law has been demonstrated empirically 
only by stacking many earthquake sequences (see Helmstetter and Sornette, 2003 and 
references therein). We had been working for several years on the theoretical 
understanding of a statistical seismicity model, known at the ETAS model, a self-
excited Hawkes conditional point process in mathematical parlance. This model or its 
siblings are now used as the standard benchmarks in statistical seismology and for 
evaluating other earthquake forecast models (Jordan, 2006; Schorlemmer et al., 2007a, 
2007b). We had the intuition that the inverse Omori law for foreshocks could be 
derived from the direct Omori law by viewing mainshocks as the ‘aftershocks of 
foreshocks, conditional on the magnitude of mainshocks being larger than that of their 
progenitors’. But we could not find the mathematical trick to complete the theoretical 
derivation. In parallel, we were working on the statistical properties of financial returns 
and were starting a collaboration with J.-F. Muzy, one of the discoverers of a new 
stochastic random walk with exact multifractal properties, named the multifractal 
random walk (MRW; Bacry et al., 2001; Muzy and Bacry, 2002), which seems to be a 
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powerful model of financial time series. We then realized that similar questions could 
be asked on the precursory as well as posterior behavior of financial volatility around 
shocks. The analysis of the data showed clear Omori-like and inverse Omori-like 
behavior around both exogenous (Sept. 11, 2001, or the coup against Gorbachev in 
1991) and endogenous shocks. It turned out that we were able to formulate the solution 
mathematically within the formalism of the MRW and we showed the deep link 
between the precursory increase and posterior behavior around financial shocks 
(Sornette et al., 2003). In particular, we showed a clear quantitative relationship 
between the relaxation after an exogenously caused shock and the relaxation following 
a shock arising spontaneously (termed ‘endogenous’). Then, inspired by the conceptual 
path used to solve the problem in the financial context, we were able to derive the 
solution in the context of the ETAS model, demonstrating mathematically the deep 
link between the inverse Omori law for foreshocks and the direct Omori law for 
aftershocks in the context of the ETAS model (Helmstetter et al., 2003; Helmstetter 
and Sornette, 2003). The path was simpler and clearer for financial time series and 
their study clarified the methodology to be used for the more complicated specific 
point processed modeling earthquakes.  
This remarkable back-and-forth thought process between two a priori very 
different fields will remain a personal highlight of my scientific life. 
 
3. On self-organizing processes and multi-level analysis 
The emphasis of Hollingworth and Müller (2008) on self-organizing processes 
and multi-level analysis to comprehend the nature of complex social systems is 
welcome as it indeed reflects an important strategy used by researchers. But more 
problematic is the endorsement of the claims, which are variations of a common theme, 
that  
(1) ‘increasingly analysts maintain that such systems are not susceptible to 
mathematical analysis, but must be understood by letting them evolve—over 
time or with simulation analysis’, 
(2) ‘the emerging perspective, rapidly diffusing across academic disciplines, 
suggests that the world does not change in predictable way’, 
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(3) ‘hardly any scientist in these fields is able to make successful predictions about 
the future, as self-organizing processes are understood best by retrospective 
analysis’. 
Hollingworth and Müller (2008) give thus resonance to a view upheld by various 
groups in different communities, which I find misguided and dangerous, while 
unfortunately widespread.  
 
 3.1 On models of complex systems 
Let me first address claims (1) and (2), perhaps best personified by Stephan Wolfram 
and elaborated in his massive book entitled ‘A New Kind of Science’ (Wolfram, 2002). 
According to Wolfram, the most interesting problems presented by nature (biological, 
physical, societal) are likely to be formally undecidable or computationally irreducible, 
rendering proofs and predictions impossible. Take the example of the Earth's crust and 
the problem of earthquake prediction or the economies and financial markets of 
countries and the question of predicting their recessions and their financial crashes. 
Because these events depend on the delicate interactions of millions of parts, and 
seemingly insignificant accidents can sometimes have massive repercussions, it is 
argued that their inherent complexity makes such events utterly unknowable and 
unpredictable. To understand precisely what this means, let us refer to the mathematics 
of algorithmic complexity (Chaitin, 1987), which provides one of the formal 
approaches to the study of complex systems. Following a logical construction related to 
that underpinning Gödel’s (1931) incompleteness theorem, most complex systems have 
been proved to be computationally irreducible, i.e. the only way to decide about their 
evolution is to actually let them evolve in time. The only way to find out what will 
happen is to actually let it happen. Accordingly, the future time evolution of most 
complex systems appears inherently unpredictable. Such statement plays a very 
important role in every discussion on how to define and measure complexity.  
However, it turns out that this and other related theorems (see Chaitin, 1987 and 
Matthew Cook in Wolfram, 2002) are useless for most practical purposes and are in 
fact misleading for the development of scientific understanding. And the following 
explains why. In a now famous essay entitled ‘More Is Different’, Phil Anderson 
(1972), 1977 Nobel Prize winner and a founder of the Santa Fe Institute of complexity, 
 6 
described how features of organization arise as an ‘emergent’ property of systems, with 
completely new laws describing different levels of magnification. As a consequence, 
Physics for instance works and is not hampered by computational irreducibility. This is 
because physicists only ask for answers at some coarse-grained level (see Buchanan, 
2005 for a pedagogical presentation of these ideas). In basically all sciences, one aims 
at predicting coarse-grained properties. Only by ignoring most of molecular detail, for 
example, did researchers ever develop the laws of thermodynamics, fluid dynamics and 
chemistry, providing remarkable tools for explaining and predicting new phenomena. 
From this perspective, one could say that the fundamental theorems of algorithm 
complexity are like pious acts of homage to our intellectual ancestors: they are 
solemnly taken out, exhibited, and solemnly put away as useless for most practical 
applications. The reason for the lack of practical value is the focus on too many details, 
forgetting that systems become coherent at some level of description. In the same vein, 
the butterfly effect, famously introduced by E. Lorenz (1963; 1972) to communicate the 
concept of sensitivity upon initial conditions in chaos, is actually not relevant to explain 
and predict the coherent meteorological structures at large scales. As a result of the 
spontaneous organization of coherent structures (Holmes et al., 1998), there is actually 
predictability in meteorology and climate as well as in many other systems, at time 
scales of months to years, in apparent contradiction with the superficial insight 
provided by the butterfly effect. 
These points were made beautifully clear by Israeli and Goldenfeld (2004; 
2006), in their study of cellular automata, the very mathematical models that has led 
Wolfram to make his grand claims that science should stop trying to make predictions 
and scientists should only run cellular automata on their computers to reproduce, but 
not explain, the complexity of the world. Cellular automata are systems defined in 
discrete Manhattan-like meshed spaces and evolve in discrete time steps, with discrete-
valued variables interacting according to simple rules. These remarkable simple 
systems have been shown to be able to reproduce many of the behavior of complex 
systems. In particular, it is known that most of them are ‘universal Turing 
computational machines’, i.e. they are capable of emulating any physical machine. 
Because they can emulate any other computing device, they are therefore undecidable 
and unpredictable. But which of the systems are capable of universal computation is not 
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generally known. In this respect, one results stands out, for our purpose. Matthew 
Cook, whose theorem is reported in (Wolfram, 2002), showed that one simple cellular 
automaton, known as ‘rule 110’ in Wolfram’s nomenclature of one-dimensional 
cellular automata with nearest-neighbor interaction rules, is such a universal Turing 
machine.  
Now, Navot Israeli and Nigel Goldenfeld applied a technique called 
‘renormalization group’ (Wilson, 1999) to search for what could be the new laws, if 
any, that describe the coarse-grained average evolution of such cellular automata. 
Technically, the new laws are determined by a self-consistency condition that (i) 
coarse-graining the initial conditions and applying the new laws should provide the 
same final description as (ii) letting evolve the system according to the true 
microscopic laws and then coarse-graining the resulting pattern. By coarse-graining, 
one focuses only on the most relevant details of the pattern-forming processes. Israeli 
and Goldenfeld established that computationally irreducible cellular automata become 
predictable and even computationally reducible at a coarse-grained level of description. 
The resulting coarse-grained cellular automata that they constructed by coarse-graining 
different cellular automata were found to emulate the large-scale behavior of the 
original systems without accounting for small-scale details. In particular, rule 110 was 
found to become a much simpler predictable system, upon coarse-graining. By 
developing exact coarse-grained procedures on computationally irreducible cellular 
automata, Israeli and Goldenfeld have demonstrated that a scientific predictive theory 
may simply depend on finding the right level for describing the system. For physicists, 
this is not a surprise: by asking only for approximate answers, Physics is not hampered 
by computational irreducibility, and I believe that this statement holds for all natural 
and social sciences with empirical foundations. 
 
3.2 On predictability of the future in complex systems 
Let me now turn to the third claim cited in the above introduction of section 3 that 
‘hardly any scientist in these fields is able to make successful predictions about the 
future’, and more generally that predicting the future from the past is inherently 
impossible from most complex systems. This view has recently been defended 
persuasively in concrete prediction applications, such as in the socially important issue 
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of earthquake prediction (see e.g. the contributions in Nature debate [1999]). In 
addition to the persistent failure in reaching a reliable earthquake predictive scheme up 
to the present day, this view is rooted theoretically in the analogy between earthquakes 
and self-organized criticality (Bak, 1996). Within this ‘fractal’ framework, there is no 
characteristic scale and the power law distribution of earthquake sizes suggests that the 
large earthquakes are nothing but small earthquakes that did not stop. Large 
earthquakes are thus unpredictable because their nucleation appears to be not different 
from that of the multitude of small earthquakes. 
Does this really hold for all features of complex systems? Take our personal 
life. We are not really interested in knowing in advance at what time we will go to a 
given store or drive in a highway. We are much more interested in forecasting the 
major bifurcations ahead of us, involving the few important things, like health, love and 
work that count for our happiness. Similarly, predicting the detailed evolution of 
complex systems has no real value and the fact that we are taught that it is out of reach 
from a fundamental point of view does not exclude the more interesting possibility to 
predict the phases of evolutions of complex systems that really count (Sornette, 1999).  
It turns out that most complex systems around us do exhibit rare and sudden 
transitions, that occur over time intervals that are short compared with the characteristic 
time scales of their prior or posterior evolution. Such extreme events express more than 
anything else the underlying ‘forces’ usually hidden by almost perfect balance and thus 
provide the potential for a better scientific understanding of complex systems. By 
focusing on these characteristic events, and in the spirit of the coarse-graining metaphor 
of the cellular automata discussed in section 3.1, a small but growing number of 
scientists are re-considering the claims of unpredictability. After the wave of complete 
pessimism on earthquake prediction in the West of the 1980s and 1990s, international 
earthquake prediction experiments such as the recently formed Collaboratory for the 
Study of Earthquake Predictability (CSEP; Jordan, 2006) and the Working Group on 
Regional Earthquake Likelihood Models (RELM; Schorlemmer et al., 2007a, 2007b) 
aim to investigate scientific hypotheses about seismicity in a systematic, rigorous and 
truly prospective manner by evaluating the forecasts of models against observed 
earthquake parameters (time, location, magnitude, focal mechanism, etc) that are taken 
from earthquake catalogs. 
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Recent developments suggest that non-traditional approaches, based on the 
concepts and methods of statistical and nonlinear physics could provide a middle way 
to direct the numerical resolution of more realistic models and the identification of 
relevant signatures of impending catastrophes, and in particular of social crises. 
Enriching the concept of self-organizing criticality, the predictability of crises would 
then rely on the fact that they are fundamentally outliers (Johansen and Sornette, 2001), 
e.g. financial crashes are not scaled-up versions of small losses, but the result of 
specific collective amplifying mechanisms (see chapter 3 in Sornette, 2003, where this 
concept is documented empirically and discussed in the context of coherent structures 
in hydrodynamic turbulence and of financial market crashes). To address this 
challenge, the available theoretical tools comprise in particular bifurcation and 
catastrophe theories, dynamical critical phenomena and the renormalization group, 
nonlinear dynamical systems, and the theory of partially (spontaneously or not) broken 
symmetries. Some encouraging results have been gathered on concrete problems (see 
the reviews Sornette, 2005, 2008 and references therein), such as the prediction of the 
failure of complex engineering structures (a challenge generally thought unreachable by 
most material scientists), the detection of precursors to stock market crashes with real 
advance published predictions (another unattainable challenge generally according to 
most financial economists) and the prediction of human parturition and epileptic 
seizures, to cite some subjects I have been involved with, with exciting potential for a 
variety of other fields.  
Other pioneers in different disciplines are slowly coming up to grip with the 
potential for a degree of predictability of extreme events in many complex systems 
(see, for instance, the chapters in Albeverio et al., 2005). Let us also mention Jim 
Crutchfield who proposes that connections between the past and future could be 
predicted for virtually any system with a ‘computational mechanics’ approach based on 
sorting various histories of a system into classes, so that the same outcome applies for 
all histories in each class (Ay and Crutchfield, 2005; Crutchfield and Görnerup, 2006). 
Again, many details of the underlying system may be inconsequential, so that an 
approximate description much like Isreali and Goldenfeld’s coarse-grained cellular 
automata models can be organized and used to make predictions.  
Agent-based models developed to mimic financial markets have been found to 
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exhibit a special kind of predictability. While being unpredictable most of the time, 
these systems show transient dynamical pockets of predictability in which agents 
collectively take predetermined courses of action, decoupled from past history. Using 
so-called minority and majority games as well as real financial time series, a 
surprisingly large frequency of these pockets of predictability have been found, 
implying a collective organization of agents and of their strategies which ‘condense’ 
into transitional herding regimes (Lamper et al., 2002; Andersen and Sornette, 2005). 
Again, grand claims of intrinsic lack of predictability seem to me like throwing out the 
baby with the bath water, forgetting that the heterogeneous nature in space and time of 
the self-organization of complex systems does not exclude partial predictability at some 
coarse-grained level. 
Let me end this discussion by extrapolating and forecasting that a larger 
multidisciplinary integration of the physical and social sciences together with artificial 
intelligence and soft-computational techniques, fed by analogies and fertilization across 
the natural and social sciences, will provide a better understanding of the limits of 
predictability of crises. 
 
4. Concluding remarks on Quantum Decision Theory and the Theory of Networks 
I would like to conclude with two remarks. 
Hollingworth and Müller (2008) contrast the ‘old’ Descartes–Newton Science I 
with the new Science II framework which emphasizes concepts such as complex 
adaptive systems, self-organization and multi-scale patterns, scale invariance, networks 
and other buzzwords. I was surprised not to see discussed another Science, the 
‘Quantum Science’ emerging from the scientific and philosophical revolution triggered 
by the understanding that Nature works through the agency of fundamentally quantum 
mechanical laws, which have very little to do with the macroscopic laws apparent 
directly to our five perception senses. In my view, for a variety of disciplines, but 
perhaps not yet for the social sciences, quantum mechanics has had more impact than 
Science II. At the ontological level, Quantum Science has had a tremendous influence 
in all fields, by providing a fundamental probabilistic framework, rooted in the 
Heisenberg uncertainty principle, the intrinsic non-separability theorem and the 
existence of intrinsic sources of noise and energy in the fluctuations of the ‘void’ 
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(showing that the void does not exist ontologically). This has attacked, much more 
deeply than e.g. the theory of chaos ever has, the misconception that future scenarios 
are deterministic and fully predictable.  
In this concluding section, I would like to suggest that Quantum Science may 
enjoy a growing impact in the social sciences, via the channel of decision making 
operating in humans by emphasizing the importance of taking into account the 
superposition of composite prospects, whose aggregated behavior form the structures, 
such as society and economies, that scholars strive to understand. In a preliminary 
essay, Slava Yukalov and I have introduced a ‘quantum decision theory’ (QDT) of 
decision making based on the mathematical theory of separable Hilbert spaces on the 
continuous field of complex numbers (Yukalov and Sornette, 2008), the same 
mathematical structure on which quantum mechanics is based. This mathematical 
formulation captures the effect of superposition of composite prospects, including 
many incorporated intentions, which allows us to describe a variety of interesting 
fallacies and anomalies that have been reported to characterize the decision making 
processes of real human beings. 
My second remark concerns the claim that ‘complex networks allow for a 
transfer of theoretical models across widely disparate fields’. I am afraid that the 
optimism that the theory of complex networks will play such a special role is nothing 
but another hype, somewhat in the lineage of those in the last decades that involved 
buzzwords such as fractals, chaos, self-organized criticality. They all had their period 
of fame and excesses, followed by maturation towards a more reasonable balanced 
position within the grand edifice of science. With Max Werner, we have recently 
commented on the limits of applying network theory in the field of earthquake 
modeling and predictability (Sornette and Werner, 2008) and I believe much the same 
criticisms would apply to the use of network theory to the social sciences. With 
Yannick Malevergne and Alex Saichev, we have developed in theoretical synthesis 
(Malevergne et al., 2008) showing in particular that the mechanism of ‘preferential 
attachment’, at the basis of the understanding of scale-free networks found in social 
networks, the world-wide web, or networks of proteins reacting with each other in the 
cell, is nothing but a rediscovery and rephrasing in a slightly different language of the 
famous model of incoming and growing firms developed by Simon in 1955, based on 
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Gibrat principle of proportional growth (Gibrat, 1931). The ‘new’ science of networks 
has thus deep roots in economics! Viewing the rather unsophisticated level of many 
discussions on power laws and other statistical regularities reported in the ‘new’ 
science of networks, while not disputing the existence of significant progress in 
network theory, I wonder whether this ‘new’ science would not profit from a better 
reading of the best works in economics of the twentieth century. Ending on a more 
positive note, this illustrates my fervent faith in the power of interdisciplinarity, 
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